Issues

Lebanon

Assessing the Impact of Lebanon’s June 7th Parliamentary Elections

By Tareq Kayali
Posted on Wednesday June 17, 2009

United States Institute of Peace Presentation:
Assessing the Impact of Lebanon’s June 7th Parliamentary Elections
Monday, June 15th, 2009 10:00 AM
United States Institue of Peace
1200 17th Street N.W. – Washington, D.C. 20036

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a panel of Middle East academics to discuss the impact of the Lebanese election on Lebanon, the region, and the U.S. The panel consisted of Graeme Bannerman, founder of Bannerman Associates and an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute; Steven Heydemann, special adviser to the Muslim World Initiative at USIP; and Randa Slim, a Jennings Randolph Guest Scholar at USIP. The panel was moderated by Mona Yacoubian, Lebanon Working Group director and Muslim World Initiative special adviser.

Ms. Yacoubian began with a recap of the National Defense Institute assessment of the elections. On the positive side, the election was well administered, with a 55% turnout rate. Lebanon’s Interior Minister Ziad Baroud, himself a reform activist, displayed an impressive level of impartiality and professionalism. For the first time, the election was held as a one day event, another positive step for the Lebanese. However, as with any election, there were some minor flaws, notably in the lax financial rules that engendered reports of vote buying. There were several administrative problems as well, such as long lines and massive delays at polling stations, as well as complaints about lack of pre-printed ballots and uneven district sizes. All in all, however, Lebanon’s elections went exceedingly well, and Ms. Yacoubian remarked that the results left the international community with three major questions to ponder; what accounted for the March 14th bloc’s victory, what’s next for Lebanon, and what do the election results say about the status of the Christian community in Lebanon?

Bannerman, the first panelist, offered his view on the election. He said one of the reasons the election was such a success was that the Lebanese people whole-heartedly believed they could impact their country’s future through their votes, and consequently turned out in massive numbers. Discussing the election results, he spoke of the two areas he believes the opposition lost the election: the Sunni vote was much more solid in its support of the March 14th bloc than expected and general Aoun was unable to garner enough support in the Christian community. General Aoun erred, according to Bannerman, by antagonizing the Patriarch, costing himself Christian votes. He also erred by distancing himself from the popular Christian President Michel Suleiman. Bannerman did point out that despite their loss; the opposition still won the popular vote. He then offered another question to be considered: what happens to the opposition now? The March 14th bloc cannot rule Lebanon without consensus, and needs the participation of the March 8th bloc in government. When viewing the results of the election, Bannerman pointed out that while Hezbollah clearly represents the Shi’a population and Sa’ad Harriri clearly represents the Sunni population, Lebanon’s Christian population is much more complicated, and does not have one clear representative.

Ms. Randa Slim also brought three questions to the panel: what are the lessons learned from this election, what can we expect to occur in Lebanon in the coming months, and what does the March 8th bloc loss mean for Hezbollah? In answering the first question, Slim indicated that the issue in Lebanon is now the Sunni-Shi’a relationship, with their respective representatives (Harriri and Nasrallah) the two key leaders in Lebanon. The Christian community, split between the two camps, has taken a backseat to the Sunni-Shi’a relationship. She proposed that General Aoun is the loser in this election, as now the Christian Leadership council is up for grabs. And it became apparent that sectarian politics, specifically politics of the religious sects, is a way of life in Lebanon. In terms of what to expect going forward, Ms. Slim said that there will be some form of unity government, most likely headed by Sa’ad Harriri as Prime Minister. The key question is how the other portfolios (defense, treasury, interior) will be split among the other sects. Addressing the question of Hezbollah’s loss, Ms. Slim gave an interesting answer. According to her, Hezbollah’s success matrix was compromised of four different objectives: maintaining absolute control and representation of the Shi’a community, strengthening the March 8th coalition, preserving the political status quo regarding their weapons, and achieving a parliamentary majority. Hezbollah succeeded in all but the last of their matrices, meaning the election results weren’t necessarily as big of a defeat to the group as originally assumed.

The final panelist, Mr. Heydemann, spoke of the regional impact and implications of the Lebanese elections. He said that the common perception, due to the pro-west March 14th bloc defeating the predominantly shi’a March 8th bloc, was that President Obama, in effect, scored a victory over Syria and Iran. Heydemann suggested that while this perception was overly simplified, it did contain an element of truth. March 14th’s victory highlighted a gradual decline in the popularity of Islamist groups and an increase in the popularity of pro-west governing coalitions. Heydemann then surprised the audience by declaring that the actual impact of the elections, regionally, was modest. He did not feel that this election would precipitate any real changes in the region, nor would it affect any of the on-going issues in the region. If anything, he said, Lebanese issues are now less likely to get in the way of U.S/Syria talks.

The overall theme of the panel centered on the need for consensus in Lebanon. Even though Hezbollah did not gain parliamentary majority, due to Lebanon’s unique system of governance they remain a vital part of Lebanon’s government, and Sa’ad Harriri will still have his work cut out for him. Hezbollah has managed to prolong the status quo on the subject of their weapons, and the opposition as a whole is not in bad shape, as they still won the popular vote. The panelists all agreed that the key now is the relationship that develops between Sa’ad Harriri and Hezbollah: Can Harriri afford to give Hezbollah veto power in governance, and if not how does he keep them happy? How will the question of Hezbollah’s weapons be dealt with? Can the different factions in government achieve a consensus without resorting to sectarian divisions and violence, something they have had a hard time with in the past? All panelists agreed that these were the key questions that Lebanon faces. Regionally, the panelists also agreed that the impact is negligible. Each side had a larger regional power behind it (March 8th bloc backed by Syria/Iran, March 14th bloc backed by Saudi Arabia and the West,) but the true winner in these elections was Lebanon herself.